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    Absract: Both donors and recipients must negotiate before they agree upon foreign 
aid contracts. As a first step to study aid negotiations, we start to assume a sole motive of 
aid to be selfish. Even in a simple setting (one donor, one recipient and one good), we 
found some interesting results. Although this is quite natural, foreign aid occurs only 
when the wealth difference between a donor and a recipient is high. Also, depending on 
the negotiations, their welfare levels and income inequality vary. Both countries become 
better-off and the income inequality declines while one becomes better-off (the other 
remains the same) and the income inequality rises.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
    Even in this new century, the United Nations declared the Millennium 
Development Goals as our common objective of human beings to fight the extreme 
poverty and hunger widespread in the world. Despite of the substantial mounts and 
continuous efforts of foreign aid, there still exist not a small number of under-developed 
countries and regions where people suffer from shortage ofbasic human needs and rights. 
    Efficiency of foreign aid has been a popular esearch topic for the previous decade. 
Recently, foreign aid began to be analyzed in a game theoretic framework' since one of 
the most serious shortages inthe past literature had been lack of strategic aspect of foreign 
aid. 
    As foreign aid studies by the non-cooperative game theory, those of the principal 
agent models formed a major field. 
    Svensson (2000a) started to analyze foreign aid in his principal agent model where 
one donor government is a principal and two recipient governments are agents. Azam 
and Laffont (2003) is one of the most typical examples of principal agent model 
application i to foreign aid distribution. In their simple setting, one donor (principal) 
sends foreign aid to one recipient (agent) where the former can be interpreted as the 
North and the latter as the South. The biggest contribution of these two studies would be 
their counter proposal against acommon view in the foreign aid literature. Foreign aid 
without any condition has been believed (especially in the international institutions) tobe 
the best for the welfare and the economic growth of recipients. On the contrary, both 
studies found that foreign aid is ineffective without any conditionality. 
    Several studies (c.f. Ribar and Wilhelm (2002)) followed two of the above research
' Research topic is further extended to military aid and war. Murshed and Sen (1995) 
analyze foreign aid to two types of recipient countries which react differently on their 
military enlargement after receiving aid. Panagariya and Shibata (2000) analyze aid to 
affect he war possibility between two recipient countries whose relationship ishighly 
tense. Lin (2001) constructs a game where two rival donor countries compete to gain an 
international reputation by distributing foreign aid. Also, foreign aid is analyzed in 
strategic international trade models (c.f. Lahiri, Raimondos-Moller, Wong and Woodland 
(2002), Dercon and Krishnan (2003), Bandyopadhyay and Majumdar (2004)). As a few 
examples of foreign aid studies by cooperative game theory, Kowalczyk and Sjostorm 
(2000, 1994) explains GATT or WTO agreement by a core formation, interpreting 
foreign aid as an income transfer given to a new member. 
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extending the simple settings of principal and agent. Hsieh (2000) analyzes a case where 
two types of individuals (laborers and capitalists) exist in a recipient country and a 
donor's objective is to stabilize a macro economy in a recipient. Svensson (2000b) 
increases the number of recipients so that there are multiple interest groups in a recipient 
country. Rai (2002) constructed a model of multiple societies in a recipient country 
where rich and poor individuals coexist in each society. Lahiri and Rainiondos-Moller 
(2000) analyzes foreign aid in a model where identical religious groups or races coexist 
both in the recipient and donor countries. Each group in the donor country urges the 
donor government to help its overseas compatriots in the recipient country. 
    Although quite a few of papers ucceeded in explaining foreign aid in principal 
agent models, motives of aid of donors were all altruistic. Here, a fundamental question 
is whether donors sacrifice themselves to help recipients. An immediate and proper 
answer would be negative. In reality, both donors and recipients will never lose after 
foreign aid occurred. In particular, individuals in donor countries will never expect their 
government to lose after sending foreign aid because aid resources come fromm the 
government budget taxed on their own income. If the donor government decides to send 
aid which is sure to damage the donor's welfare, such a government will be ousted by the 
next election. 
    This paper assumes a sole motive of aid to be selfish in order to start from the 
simplest setting of foreign aid negotiations. Whenever any negotiation matters, every 
party tries to maximize their own profit, naturally neglecting other parties' profit. In fact, 
most foreign aid flows are called as Official Development Assistance (ODA), so that 
donor and recipient governments must negotiate o agree upon an official contract.. Of 
course, motives of foreign aid could be at least partially altruistic, but this paper focuses 
on a negotiation side, not an assistance side of foreign aid. 
    Furthermore, we step back even from the traditional role of donors and recipients a
principal and agent, so as to deal with negotiations of foreign aid. Both donors and 
recipients are treated as equal parties uch that either party can be a principal or agent, 
depending on various ituations of aid negotiations. At the same time, we made other 
assumptions of this model as simple as possible in this first analysis of aid negotiations: 
one donor, one recipient, one good, and one neoclassical production function. 
    Therefore, inthis paper, adonor and a recipient negotiate so that both will not lose 
after the foreign aid occurs. Namely, according to any aid contract, whenever the donor 
sends foreign aid transfer to the recipient, he donor must receive a returning transfer 
from the recipient afterwards. This situation may seem quite unusual in a context of 
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foreign aid because the recipient pays back to the donor. However, it becomes 
understandable once the logic is explained as follows. A rich country holds a high 
endowment of inputs while a poor country does not. If the rich transfer some inputs to 
the poor country, the poor will enjoy an increased amount of output. Moreover, a gain in 
the poor is larger than a loss in the rich owing to the decreasing marginal product. Even 
though the poor transfer a positive portion of the increased output back to the rich, both 
can be better-off. Thus, the rich and the poor are willing to sign a contract to play a role 
as a donor and a recipient, and to exchange a resource transfer in part as foreign aid. 
    Even in this simple model of foreign aid by selfish donors, we were able to explain a
couple of fundamental features of real ODA flows, First, foreign aid occurs only when an 
income difference between donor and recipient countries i high. Second, depending on 
the negotiations between donors and recipients, both countries become better-off, or 
either of them becomes better-off while the other emains the same. In the first case, the 
relative income inequality decreases while the absolute inequality does not change. In the 
second case, both inequality measures increase when only the donor becomes better-off, 
and vice-versa. 
    The structure of this paper after the introduction is as follows. In Section 2, foreign 
aid games are introduced in two situations where the difference of input endowments is 
high or low. After the negotiation processes, agreed contracts between the donor and the 
recipient are explained. In Section 3, three types of foreign aid negotiations are analyzed 
and resulted income levels of the donor and the recipient are compared. In Section 4, a 
numerical example is presented and the effects of uncertainty are briefly discussed. In 
Section 5, conclusions and directions for future research are provided.
2. DONOR AND RECIPIENT 
2.1 Model 
    As a benchmark, we start to consider a situation where adonor sends foreign aid to 
a recipient, but does not receive any return back. Two countries (Aand B) are assumed to 
exist where country A wants to be a donor and vice-versa. 'There are no externalities and
no information asymmetry between both countries where individuals cannot move across 
the border. In country A, one good is produced as an output (F(A)) utilizing a 
endowment of inputs (A > 0). Thus, Country As welfare is measured by F(A) if it does 
not send foreign aid, and by F(AID) if it sends aid. In the same way, Country B's welfare 
is F(B) without foreign aid while it is F(BJD) with aid, Now, we assume an economic 
condition for both countries a follows:
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F(A) > F(AD) (1) 
F(BID) > F(B) (2) 
F(AD) + F(BID) > F(A) + F(B) (3)
    The donor (A) becomes worse-off i it sends foreign aid while the recipient (B) 
becomes better-off i  B receives it. Also, total amount of outputs produced in both 
countries with foreign aid, becomes larger than that in the Autarky case without aid. 
    This situation is easy to understand. Country A and B are rich and poor in terms of 
endowments of inputs (A > B). If an endowment difference is extremely large, marginal 
product in A is far less than in B because of the neoclassical production function. Then, 
Country A (a donor) sends asmall portion of its endowment as foreign aid to Country B 
(a recipient), which yields the situation of Inequality 3. Still, it is true that Country B has 
an incentive to receive aid but Country A does not because the welfare level of Country A 
decreases.
2.2 Gains Claim 
    The recipient sends an income transfer back to the donor when both agreed on an 
aidd contract that the donor can claim their share out of the gains generated in the 
recipient. The donor's and the recipient's welfares (V) after they exchange anincome 
transfer with each other are represented by V(AID) and V(BID) where r > 0 means 
income return (gains claim) from the recipient tothe donor:
V(AID)=F(AD)+t (4) 
V(BID) =F(BID) - r (5)
   Then, from Inequality 3, the gain 
loss of the donor by sending aid:
of the recipient by receiving aid is larger than the
' In this paper
, both countries produce an identical good, and 
which means the price of this good is one. Of course, welfare 
should be evaluated by each utility level. However, according to 
field (c.f. Knack and Rahman (2007)), welfare comparison is sim 
the amount of output.
so evaluate it equally, 
level of each country 
leading studies in this 
plified to be based on
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   V(BID) -F(B) > Fl(t) - V(AID) (6) 
    Both countries will agree upon an aid contract if they remain to be better-off even 
after the donor receives anincome return from the recipient. An amount ofreturn must 
satisfy next two inequalities though it is not uniquely determined: 
   VWID) =F(AID) +t>-F(A) (7) 
   V(BID) =F(BID) - r >- F(B) (8) 
    In the real foreign aid distribution, it is almost impossible for the recipient to
transfer an income return to the donor. But, we can easily imagine that a donor sends a 
project aid to enhance export capacities in a recipient such that the donor holds an 
advantageous position to import from the recipient. For example, a donor invests for 
natural resources in arecipient such as coal, oil, and iron ore through a project aid. Also, 
through an infrastructure aid, a donor builds a dam in a recipient to increase the 
agricultural and industrial production forexports, uch as cotton, wheat, and aluminum. 
    We implicitly assume that aid and collateral transfers between a donor and a 
recipient occur at the same time, or must be carried out, in order to observe a mutual 
agreement However, asEaton and Engers (1992) and Eaton (1992) clearly analyzed, 
there xist arisk such that he recipient may not send back an agreed amount ofreturn to 
the donor even though the recipient has already been given an agreed amount of aid. 
Differently from an ordinary loan, Sovereign Debt problem can happen when the donor 
cannot take anything for security (including the aid project i self) in the recipient against 
a default. Still, the donor will cease tosend aid, and so the recipient cannot be better-off 
once the donor concerns about adefault by the recipient. Therefore, under astable and 
long term relationship between a donor and a recipient, they are always assumed to 
observe a foreign aid contract once they agreed with each other'.
' For example, Japanese government sends a large yen loan for a project in an 
economically and politically stable country like the Asian NICS. On the contrary, 
foreign aid can follow an income return like the Japanese war compensation to Asian 
countries. Also, the relationship between the donor and the recipient has been tight 
through continuous and numerous exchanges of income transfers like a foreign aid from 
England or France to its former colonial countries. 
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2.3 Basic Model Reconsidered 
    A benchmark model (Inequality 1, 2, 3) is reconsidered. Next inequality is assumed 
in stead of Inequality 3. 
   F(AD) + F(BID) cF(A) + F(B) (9) 
    Here, total amount of outputs in both countries with foreign aid is less than 
without aid. Needless to say, adonor will not agree to send foreign aid if the donor does 
not receive an income return from the recipient. Moreover, the donor will never agree to 
send aid even if the donor can receive the return. The reason is shown as next inequality: 
   F(A) - F(AD) > F(B~D) - F(B) (9) 
    Welfare loss of the donor cannot be compensated even when the recipient send any 
positive portion of the increased amount ofoutput to the donor. Therefore, weobtained 
a next proposition to determine whether foreign aid is sent or not. 
Proposition 1 Under the situation that F(A) > F(AID) and F(B/D) >F(B), foreign aid 
occurs with a proper amount ofincome r turn only ifF(A/D) + F(B/D) > F(A) + F(B). 
    The situation of Inequality 9 emerges when the endowment difference b tween a 
donor and a recipient is small, eading to a small difference of marginal products. The 
opposite side of this result is that foreign aid between two countries is never fulfilled if
their income l vels are close. this seems tobe such anatural feature ofa real distribution 
of foreign aid. 
3. FOREIGN AID NEGOTIATIONS 
3.1 Donor's Initiative 
    We will analyze how the amount ofincome return (t) is determined depending on
three patterns of negotiations: one-shot negotiations by donor's and recipient's initiative, 
and recursive n gotiations between two countries alternately (c.fMyerson (1991)). 
    First, a donor initiates one-shot negotiation to a recipient, given the endowment of 
inputs in both countries. Then, the donor proposes anaid contract toa recipient which 
specifies amounts of foreign aid and income return between two countries. If the 
recipient rejects he contract, the Autarky levels of outputs are produced without foreign 
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aid. If the recipient accepts the contract, the donor sends an agreed amount offoreign aid 
to the recipient, and receives anagreed amount ofincome r turn from the recipient when 
the production f outputs i done with foreign aid. 
    Donor's objective is to maximize itswelfare (V(AJD)) by a foreign aid negotiation. 
Since donor's welfare must be larger than or equal to the Autarky level, next constraint s 
necessary for foreign aid contract tobe negotiated: 
   V(A/D) t F(A) > F(AID) (10) 
    Recipient's welfare must be also larger than or equal to the Autarky level. A 
constraint forthe recipient is shown as: 
  V(BID) a F(B) (I1) 
    Maximization of the donor's welfare isrepresented as next equation: 
   V(BID) =F(B/D)-t= F(B) (12) 
    The donor eceives all the rent generated by foreign aid. So, the amount ofincome 
return iscalculated as next equation: 
   t=F(B/D) -F(B) (12') 
    Therefore, from Inequality 3, the donor becomes better-off by this foreign aid 
negotiation. 
   V(A/D) = F(A/D) + t= F(A/D) + F(B/D) - F(B) > F(A) (13) 
3.2 Recipient's Initiative 
    Second, similarly tothe above case, arecipient initiates one-shot negotiation, given 
the endowment of inputs. Then, the recipient offers acontract toa donor that specifies 
amounts offoreign aid and income r turn, If the donor ejects he contract, the Autarky 
levels of outputs are produced without foreign aid. If the donor accepts the contract, the 
donor and the recipient exchange the agreed amounts offoreign aid and income return 
with each other. 
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    The same constraints as in the above case (Inequality 11 and 12) are necessary for 
both the recipient and the donor to participate an aid negotiation. The welfare 
maximization of the recipient is given as next equation:
V(AID) =F(A/D) + t= F(A) (14)
    The recipient, not the donor receives all the rent of foreign aid. Then, the amount 
of income return is calculated as:
t= F(A) - F(AID) (14')
    Therefore, from Inequality 3, the recipient becomes better-off by this foreign aid 
negotiation.
V(B/D) = F(B/D) - r= F(A/D) + F(B/D) - F(A) > F(B) (15)
3.3 Continuous and Alternate Negotiations 
    In stead of one-shot negotiation, both a donor and a recipient negotiate 
continuously such that one party offers its own contract after it rejects he offer from the 
other party. We apply the Nash negotiation equilibrium into this situation, assuming 
zero future discount rate for both countries. Each party negotiates o gain the largest 
share out of the possible r nt, which is a remainder of the output increase in the recipient 
from compensating the donor's output up to the Autarky level. Then, the Nash 
negotiation equilibrium4 is shown as [F(A) - F(AID) + F(BID) - F(B)J12. So, income 
return (I") from the recipient tothe donor is derived as: 
  F(A/D) + F(B/D) - F(B) > f e 
              - F(A)- F(A/D) + F(B/D) - F(B) (16) 
2
 'Ibi
s result is based on the assumption that both are equal negotiation partners. Of 
course, one party may well be equipped with more negotiation power than the other. It is 
natural to consider that the donor tends to be more advantageous than the recipient 
partly because it owns more resources and partly because it should be more patient. 
Then, the resulted equilibrium could be more biased to the donor.
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               > F(AID) + F(B/D) - F(A) 
    From Inequality 3, 
   V(A/D) + F(A/D) + t = F(A/D) + F(A) -_E(AID) + F(B/D) - F(B) 
2 
                  =F(A) +F(AD)-F(A)+F'(B/D)-F(B) 
                             2 (17) 
                  >F(A) 
    Next proposition summarizes the results ofthis foreign aid negotiation: 
Proposition 2 If total amount ofoutputs inboth countries increase after foreign aid, 
1, Welfare l vels of both countries become higher or unchanged with foreign aid if 
income r turn is possible from the recipient tothe donor. 
2. The recipient remains the same while the donor becomes better-off if the donor offers a 
one-shot negotiation to the recipient. 
3. The donor emains the same while the recipient becomes better-off i  the recipient 
offers aone-shot negotiation to the donor. 
4. The donor and the recipient gain an equal share of rent if both repeat alternate 
negotiations. 
    Under the neoclassical production function, above proposition explains a direction 
of income (output) inequality between both countries for each of these three patterns of 
negotiations. 
Proposition 3 Ifforeign aid is carried out between both countries, 
1. Income inequality becomes worse if the donor offers a one-shot negotiation. 
2. Income inequality becomes better if the recipient offers a one-shot negotiation. 
3. Relative income inequality (the recipient's income divided by the donor's) becomes 
better while absolute income inequality (the donor's income minus the recipient's) does 
not change ifboth repeat lternate n gotiations. 
4. DISCUSSION 
4,1 Numerical Examples 
    We will reproduce and explain the major resultss with a help of a numerical example. 
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Output levels of a donor and a recipient without and with foreign aid are shown as: F(A) 
= 5, F(B) = 1, F(AD) = 4, and F(BID) = 3. If it were not for income r turn, two Nash 
equilibria are given as follows. One is that he donor does not send foreign aid and the 
recipient does not receive aid. 'the other is that the donor does not send aid and the 
recipient receives aid. In either equilibrium, foreign aid contract is not agreed and both 
countries nd up with the Autarky levels of output (F(A) = 5 and F(B) = 1). 
    In a normal form game [a] below, the donor as a row player chooses NS (not send 
aid) or S (send aid) while the recipient asa column player chooses NR (not receive aid) or 
R (receive aid). Then, as a Nash equilibrium, the donor chooses NS and the recipient 
does NR, or the donor does NS and the recipient does R.
     NR R NR R 
[a] NS 5,1 5,1 [b] NS 5,1 5,1 
    S 5,1 4,3 S 5,1 4+r,3-t
    What happens if the donor can claim its share on gains by the aid in the recipient? 
Income l vels of both counties withh income return (t) are shown as: V(AID) = 4 + t and 
V(BID) = 3 - t. In order for a foreign aid contract tobe agreed, we need that 2 >_ r 2 1, 
noting chat both are assumed to accept an aid contract with equality (see game [b] 
above). 
    If the donor initiates a one-shot negotiation to the recipient, income return (t) is 2, 
and welfare l vels are given as: V(AID) = 6, V(BID) = 1. As is shown in game [c] below, 
foreign aid contract is agreed as a Nash equilibrium' that he donor chooses S and the 
recipient chooses R. On the contrary, if the recipient initiates a one-shot negotiation, 
income return (t) is I, and welfare l vels are shown as: V(AID) = 5, V(BID) = 2 where the 
donor chooses S and the recipient chooses R in game [d] as a Nash Equilibrium. Lastly, 
the Nash solution is represented as: r = 1.5, V(AID) = 5.5, V(BID) = 1.5 where the donor 
does Sand the recipient does R in game [e].
s In fact, a strategy combination that the donor chooses NS and the recipient chooses NR 
(Autarky) remains aNash equilibrium in all the games [c], [d] (NS and R is also a Nash 
Equilibrium) and [e]. Still, if we consider a one shot extended version of the game [c] 
and [d] described as such, the most proceeded outcome will be an agreed foreign aid 
contract by both parties. Since there is no other Parato efficient outcome, both had better 
agree to the aid contract in game [c] than Autarky.
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     NR R NR R NR R 
[c] NS 5,1 5,1 [d] NS 5,1 5,1 [e] NS 5,1 5,1 
    S 5,1 6,1 S 5,1 5,2 S 5,1 5.5,1.5
    The donor is better-off while the recipient remains the same in the first case, but the 
recipient is better-off while the donor emains the same in the second case. In the third 
case, both are better-off. So, inequality changes are confirmed asfollows. Relative and 
absolute income inequalities widen in the first case because income differences are 4 
without aid and 5 with aid. Both inequalities narrow in the second case because income 
difference lowers to 3 and income ratios are (5 - 1)/1 = 4 without aid to (5 - 2)12 = 1.5. 
Relative inequality lowers to (5.5 - 1.5)/1.5 =2.67 but absolute inequality does not 
change inthe third case. 
    Let's uppose a numerical example r presented by Inequality 1, 2, and 10 as: F(A) _ 
4, F(AID) = 2, F(B) = 1, and F(BID) = 2. Here, two Nash equilibria are that he donor's 
not sending aid and the recipient's not accepting aid, and the donor's not sending aid and 
the recipient's accepting aid, where welfare l vels ofthe donors and the recipient are 4 and 
I without foreign aid. Welfare l vels of the donor and the recipient after income return 
are represented as: V(AID) = 2 + r and . V(BID) = 2 - r. The donor has no incentive to 
send foreign aid because the welfare becomes to V(AID) = 2 + I = 3 <- 4= F(A) even when 
r - 1. 'thus, there does not exist such an income return to improve both. At the same 
time, the recipient has no incentive toaccept foreign aid because V(AID) = 4 = F(A) but 
V(BID)=2-2=0 s4=F(4) when t = 2.
4.2 Uncertainty and Risk 
    As is explained in the end of Section 2.2, Sovereign Debt is potentially a big 
problem, which may ruin the main results in this analysis. In 1990s, recommended by 
the international institutions (including the United Nations and World Bank), 
rescheduling and renegotiation of foreign aid loans were not uncommon owing to the 
stagnated economic performances of the recipient countries especially in Africa. If 
income transfer (r) is uncertain, what would happen in this model? 
   Main results will not be altered when the donor and the recipient know the 
distribution of t beforehand. In game [b], if t is normally distributed I and 2, most 
results will be identical by the optimization of their expected incomes. Of course, the 
results depend on the distribution of t since it represents the risk of this aid contract. For
70
example, if t is distributed between 0 and 2, Autarky results will be more likely because t 
can be too low for the donor to accept i . In the same way, if t is between 1and 3, 
Autarky results will be because t can be too high for the recipient to accept i . 
    We may be able to consider some additional uncertainties or risks in this model. 
Income transfer from the recipient (td) can be different from one to the donor (tr) as in 
game [f] in the next page. Suppose that a recipient borrow ODA loans from Japan, 
which is rented and returned in the yen terms. The recipient suffers foreign exchange loss 
so that rr can be less than td if yen is appreciated. 
    Furthermore, conomic onditions may affect income and production levels in both 
the donor and the recipient. Recently, developed countries uffer from a series of 
financial crises while many developing countries are benefited by the boom of terms of 
trade gains of their major exporting oods uch as food grains and natural resources. 
Then, F(F4) could be smaller than 5, and F(B) be larger than I in game [f]. 
        NR R NR R NR R 
   [Ii NS 5,1 5,1 [g] NS 5-e,1 5-E,1 [h] NS 5-En,I 5-ey,l 
        S 5,1 4+rd,3-tr S 5,1 4+t,3-r S 5,1 4+rd,3-rr 
    The donor can he under the pressure of the international community to send aid so 
that it might lose an uncertain portion of reputation without offering an aid contract to 
the recipient. Suppose that the donor is incurred of small amount of cost (e> 0 in game 
[g]) when it does not offer an aid contract. As long as t is distributed 1and 2 and e is 
small (less than one), the results are simplified to be a unique Nash equilibrium (S and 
R). The agreement is reached between the recipient and the donor because the donor is 
afraid of reputation loss by not offering an aid contract. 
    What if the reputation cost is different? The donor pays a small amount of cost 
(En>0) when the donor does not offer an aid contract and the recipient does not want it 
(NS and NR in game [h] above), and the donor pays a small cost (ey>0) when the donor 
does not offer an aid but the recipient wants it (NS and R in game [h]). Still, the 
agreement will be reached if td and rr are identical and distributed between 1and 2. 
Even when en is zero, a minimal loss of ey is sufficient for this agreement i  game [h]. 
    Nevertheless, if td is different from or, the agreement may be more difficult o be 
reached. For example, when td is one and tr is two in game [h], an Autarky Nash 
equilibrium is added to the original agreement. The recipient offers an aid contract but 
the recipient does not accept i (S and NR in game [h]). This occurs more frequently 
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when the recipient has to pay more income return to the donor (n is higher). It is really 
ironical that the donor wishes the recipient to give up the aid contract just by curtailing 
the criticism from the international community. 
   This could be one of the reasons of foreign aid volatility' studied by many 
researchers. An occasional gap between the commitment (contract base) and the 
disbursement (real flow) figures to each recipient county is reported on the ODA data 
for many OECD countries. Disbursement becomes smaller than commitment when 
some of the projects funded by the foreign aid are stopped for the unforeseen reasons, 
such as natural disasters and political or military uprisings. We wish that the donors do 
not use these incidents as clever excuses inorder to evade foreign aid expenses.
5. CONCLUTIONS 
    This paper analyzed foreign aid negotiations in a simple game framework, assuming 
a sole motive of aid to be selfish. Furthermore, donors and recipients are not the 
principal and agent but the equal negotiators, so that both will not be worse-off with 
foreign aid, A donor with large amounts of inputs sends foreign aid to a recipient with 
small amount, and the donor receives an income return out of the output increase from 
the recipient. Both can agree upon an aid contract because both can be better-off with 
proper amounts of foreign aid and income return. 
    Foreign aid distributions are realistically characterized in this paper. A natural 
precondition for foreign aid is the high wealth difference between the donor and the 
recipient. If the donor leads a one-shot negotiation with the recipient, the donor 
becomes better-off, but the recipient remains the same, so that the income difference 
widens. On the other hand, if the recipient leads it with the donor, the results are 
opposite to the above. Continuous and alternate negotiations between the donor and the 
recipient will cause both to become better-off and the income difference to narrow. 
   A contribution of this paper if any would be for this simple model to be able to 
explain some features of the real foreign aid flows. 'Thus, there remained quite a few of 
future research topics extended from this paper. First, direct extension of this paper will 
be a case of multiple donors and/or multiple recipients where the effects of aid
6 For example, Agenor and Aizenman (2010) recently explained theoretically the fact that 
aid flows from the donor to the recipient are really volatile. They successfully construct a 
model where the aid flow is so small and volatile that the recipient remains to be in a low 
production level (poverty trap). 
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competition and collusion should be analyzed. At the same time, possible substitutes of 
the income return (gains hare) from the recipient o the donor (such as the United 
Nations votes) can be considered in this model. 
    Second, foreign aid negotiations should be strategically analyzed by altruistic 
donors, which is an established assumption i  the literature. Third, the analysis should 
include a case of more than two types of donors and recipients in terms of their wealth 
levels, Fourth, in order to follow a research frontier in this field, the effects of 
information asymmetry between the donors and the recipients had better be analyzed. 
Lastly, empirical studies are strongly demanded toverify the theoretical results in a series 
of these studies. We hope that future studies (including this) could be even a little help to 
improve foreign aid policies for the developing countries in the world. 
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